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6 Union Rights for All 
Toward Sectoral Bargaining in the United States 
Kate Andrias 
American labor unions have collapsed. Having once bargained for more than a third of 
American workers, unions now represent only about 6 percent of the private sector 
workforce. 1 In the wake of new statutory and constitutional limitations, their presence 
in the public sector is shrinking as well. 2 
As unions have declined, the United States has lost a key equalizing institution in 
politics and the economy. 3 Indeed, economic inequality is at its highest point since the 
Gilded Age, when unionization rates were similarly low.4 With the weakening of unions, 
the United States has also lost the key mechanism for protecting against employer 
domination and providing workers a voice on the job. 5 Employment law, which protects 
employees on an individual basis irrespective of unionization, has not filled the void. 
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This work is partially derived from an article originally 
published in the Yale Law Journal; see Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016). 
See JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS No LONGER Do 1, 10-30 (2014); see also BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS - 2017 (2018), www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0 
.htm [https://perma.cc/Y38D-9K4E] (providing data about union membership in 2017); cf RICHARD B. 
FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984) (describing, as of the mid-1980s, the role of 
trade unions in the United States). Despite recent declines, unions still represent about 35 percent of 
public sector workers; the unionization rate in the private sector is about six percent. BUREAU OF LABoR 
STATISTICS, supra. 
2 See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (overruling Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), the longstanding precedent that permitted public sector 
employers and unions to require workers to pay fair-share fees). 
3 ROSENFELD, supra note 1, at 4-8; see Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public 
Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise o{Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & Soc'Y 
152 (2010).0n rising political inequality, see LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 2, 285 (2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 79-81, 157-158 (2012); ROSENFELD, supra 
note l, at 170-181; KAY LEHMAN ScHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL 
VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 69-95 (2012). For an earlier account, see 
Thomas Byrne Edsall, The Changing Shape of Power: A Realignment in Public Policy, in THE RISE AND 
FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 269 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989). 
4 THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23-24 (2014-). 
5 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: How EMPLOYERS RuLE OuR LIVES (AND WHY WE 
DoN'T TALK ABoUT IT) (2017). 
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Most workers are employed at-will, entitled only to minimal wage, hour, and benefit 
protections, violations of which are not infrequent.6 
A:s other authors in this volume detail, existing labor law makes reversing unions' 
decline all but impossible. 7 The NLRA, despite its broad promise to protect concerted 
action, makes it extremely difficult for workers to organize and bargain with their 
employers. Employers have a slew of lawful tools at their disposal to resist unionization: 
they can "predict" that unionization will have a negative impact on the company; require 
workers to listen to anti-union speeches; exclude union organizers from the premises; 
shut down their enterprises following unionization; and, in many circumstances, per-
manently replace workers for striking - all without running afoul of the law. And when 
employers do violate the law - for example, by threatening or firing workers who seek to 
unionize - they risk little punishment. 8 
Moreover, even when workers are able to overcome employer resistance to unioniza-
tion, they confront a regime deeply mismatched with the contemporary economy. The 
modem economy is characterized by global supply chains, multiple levels of contracting, 
and widespread use of independent contractors, franchise relationships, and other non-
traditional and fissured forms of employment.9 The NLRA, however, channels organiz-
ing and bargaining to the level of the individual enterprise, between traditional 
employers and employees. 10 This mismatch leaves many workers unable to effectively 
exercise organizing and bargaining rights. For example, the statute excludes independent 
contractors, as well as whole sectors of the economy like domestic and agricultural 
work. 11 In addition, the law creates a process for organizing workers primarily at a single 
work-site or enterprise; it does not facilitate organizing across multiple employers in the 
economic sector, or even all subcontracted employees at a given worksite. 12 Relatedly, 
the legal obligation to bargain rests only with the "employer" and that employer is 
obligated to bargain only with its own "employees."13 Although multiunit bargaining is 
6 For further discussion of labor and employment law's failure and the relationship to political and 
economic inequality, see Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2 (2016). 
7 See, e.g., Chapter 3 in this volume. For earlier work on this topic, see Andrias, supra note 6; Cynthia L. 
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527, 1611-1612 (2002); Alan 
Hyde, The Idea of the Idea of Labour Law: A Parable, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAw 88, 97 (Guy Davidov & 
Brian Langille eds., 2011); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization 
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1769 (1983). But see Lance Compa, Not Dead Yet: Preserving 
Labor Law Strengths While Exploring New Labor Law Strategies, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 609, 610-612 
(2014) (arguing that U.S. labor and employment law regimes constructed in the twentieth century are 
viable for the twenty-first century). 
8 See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 7, at 1769-1770; Andrias, supra note 6, at 25-27. 
9 DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WoRK BECAME So BAD FOR So MANY AND WHAT CAN BE 
DONE TO IMPROVE IT 10 (2014). 
IO KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING 
WORKPLACE 290 (2004); Andrias, supra note 6, at 28-32 nn.132-159 and accompanying text. 
11 National Labor Relations Act S 2(3), 29 U.S.C. S 152(3) (2018). 
12 Andrias, supra note 6; Mark Barenberg, Widening the Scope of Worker Organizing: Legal Reforms to 
Facilitate Multi-Employer Organizing, Bargaining, and Striking, ROOSEVELT INST. (Oct. 7, 2015), http:// 
roosevel ti nsti tu te .org/wp-content/u ploads/2015 / l 0/Widen ing-th e-Scope-of-W orker-Organizing. pdf [h ttps: // 
perma.cc/MUX8-V7QJ]. 
13 For this reason, the definition of "joint employer" has been highly contested. See Hy-Brand Indus. 
Contractors, 365 N.L.R.B. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017) (overruling Browning-Ferris Indus. of California, Inc., 
362 N.L.R.B. 186 at 2 (Aug. 27, 2015)). The Board's Hy-Brand decision was vacated after the NLRB's 
Inspector General held that one member should have recused himself from the case; the Board has since 
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permitted, and has been used in various industries where employers have agreed to it, it is 
not required. 14 Finally, since the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947, the Act has also 
significantly limited the ability to engage in cross-employer collective action; labor 
organizations are not permitted to picket a "secondary» employer, even when the 
secondary employer's business is intertwined or related to that of the primary. 15 
Meanwhile, the federal government provides no affirmative support for unionization 
and bargaining, nor does it give worker organizations a seat at the table when important 
decisions about the political economy are made. 16 And broad preemption doctrine 
largely prevents states from doing so, even if they want to. In short, American law 
establishes a system of voluntaristic, decentralized unionism against a background pre-
sumption of employment-at-will and broad managerial rights; collective bargaining is a 
private negotiation between individual employers and employees that exists only where a 
majority of employees, despite extraordinary employer resistance, chooses to unionize. At 
least since 194 7, the regime has not been designed to give workers significant power over 
the political economy - and employer resistance and changes to the economy have only 
made the situation worse for workers. 
Scholars and advocates have long offered proposals to reform the NLRA. 17 But their 
proposals repeatedly have stalled in Washington, even under unified Democratic gov-
ernment.18 Indeed, in recent years, many oflabor's historic allies seemed to abandon the 
project of collective labor rights altogether, concluding that unionism in the contempor-
ary political economy was hopeless. 19 Ambitions checked, unionists' own proposals 
focused on tinkering at the edges of the existing law, without success.20 
But the decline of the twentieth-century labor law regime is not the end of the road for 
the rights and interests of working people. To the contrary: demands for fundamental 
reform are gaining steam. In particular, academics and policy makers who support 
unions have begun to converge in their calls for a new, inclusive system of sectoral 
bargaining that would enable unions to bargain to raise wages and negotiate benefits for 
all workers throughout the economy.21 Notably, almost all other industrialized 
turned to rulemaking in order to narrow the definition of joint employment. See The Standard for 
Determining Joint-Employer Status, 83 Fed. Reg. 46681 (proposed Sept. 14, 2018). 
14 Artcraft Displays, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 1233 (July 23, 1982), clarified, 263 N.L.R.B. 804 (Aug. 30, 1982); see 
Andrias, supra note 6, at 32 nn.155-156 and accompanying text; Barenberg, supra note 12. 
15 National Labor Relations Act S 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. S l 58(b)(4) (2018). 
16 See Andrias, supra note 6, at 6, 13-36; Derek C. Bok, Ref/.ections on the Distinctive Character of American 
Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1397 (1971); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "&fl.ections 
on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws," 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1, 1 (1990). 
17 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REv. 375, 399-400 (2007). 
18 Dorian T. Warren, The Politics of Labor Policy Refonn, in THE POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY REFORM IN 
POSTWAR AMERICA 103-128 Oeffery A. Jenkins & Sidney M. Milkis eds., 2014). On the history oflabor law 
reform failure, see Estlund, supra note 7, at 1611-1612. 
19 See Andrias, supra note 6, at 75 nn.389-394 and accompanying text. 
20 Id. at 27-28 nn.127-131 and accompanying text. 
21 See, e.g., DAVID RoLF, THE FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WoRI<ING AMERICA 253-258 
(2016); Andrias, supra note 6; Brishen Rogers, Libertarian Corporatism Is Not an Oxymoron, 94 TEX. 
L. REV. 1623, 1624 (2016); Kate Andrias & Brishen Rogers, Rebuilding Worker Voice in Today's Economy, 
RooSEVELT INST. (Aug. 9, 2018), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07 /Rebuilding-
Worker-Voices-linal-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M422-LQYP]; David Madland, The Future of Worker Voice 
and Power, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 2016), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/l0/0605 l 753/WorkerVoice2.pdf [https://perrna.cc/JA9C-8RDV]; David Rolf, Toward a 21st-Century 
Labor Movement, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 18, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/toward-2lst-century-labor-
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democracies use some form of sectoral or industrial bargaining.22 In such systems, the 
law facilitates or mandates bargaining throughout an economic sector, extends the fruits 
of collective bargaining to the entire sector, and/or guarantees worker organizations a seat 
at the table when governmental decisions about employment standards are made. 
Broadly inclusive sectoral bargaining, when combined with worksite bargaining, offers 
numerous advantages for workers. Scholars have shown that when the law facilitates 
power-sharing over decisions about wages, benefits, and the economy through compre-
hensive systems of sectoral bargaining, more egalitarian outcomes are achieved. 23 This is 
because, unlike firm-based bargaining, which tends to compress wages within a firm, 
sectoral bargaining directly affects wages throughout the labor market. 24 Indeed, com-
parative studies suggest that, from the perspective of creating egalitarian outcomes at the 
societal level, the critical factor in a labor law regime is the establishment of broadly 
inclusive union organizations with power to negotiate sectorally.25 
In addition, sectoral bargaining increases workers' voice in public policy decisions.26 
Depending on the design, sectoral bargaining can give worker organizations an official 
seat at the table when policy decisions affecting workers are made. More generally, 
worker organizations' broad mandate enhances their incentive and ability to serve as a 
counterweight to organized business interests in the political sphere. Indeed, giving 
worker organizations, as well as businesses, a formal role in setting social welfare policy 
could be a particularly helpful tool if, as some predict, automation becomes more 
prevalent and results in lower overall employment levels.27 In that event, employer-
based bargaining could become even more obsolete, with working people - or previously 
working people - needing to negotiate directly with the state to spread losses and gains 
from automation. 
Sectoral bargaining also responds well to the increasing problem of the fissured 
employer.28 Workers throughout an economic sector bargain together, whether 
employed by a lead firm, a contracted firm, or a temporary agency. This avoids protracted 
legal battles about the identity of the employer and provides a disincentive for companies 
to subcontract to reduce labor costs. Likewise, sectoral bargaining can cover both 
independent contractors and employees, minimizing battles over worker classification 
and extending the reach of bargaining to nontraditional workers. 
movement [https://perma.cc/DFV5-RRMU]; Lawrence Mishel Testifies Before the Democratic Platform 
Committee 2016, EcoN. POLICY INST. (June 9, 2016), www.epi.org/publication/testimony-raise-americas-
pay [https://perma.cc/5R7V-NMP6]; cf. Matthew Dimick, Productive Unionism, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REv. 
679 (2014); Barenberg, supra note 12. 
22 See Andrias, supra note 6, at 35 nn.172-177, 77-80 nn.401-420 and accompanying text. 
23 KATHLEEN THELEN, VARIETIES OF LIBERALIZATION AND THE NEW POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
SOLIDARITI (2014). 
24 Jonas Pontusson, Comparative Political Economy of Wage Distribution: The Role of Partisanship and 
Labour Market Institutions, 32 BRIT. J. PoL. Sci. 281 (2002); Michael Wallerstein, Wage-Setting Insti-
tutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies, 43 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 649, 669 (1999). 
25 STEPHEN J. SILVIA, HOLDING THE SHOP TOGETHER: GERMAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE POSTWAR 
ERA 38-41 (2013) (emphasizing the central role the law and state institutions play in sustaining the 
German industrial relations system); THELEN, supra note 23, at 204-207. 
26 Andrias, supra note 6; Rogers, supra note 16, at 40-43. 
27 See Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 
254 (2018). 
28 Andrias, supra note 6, at 78. 
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Finally, sectoral bargaining takes the most contentious disputes about wages and 
benefits outside of the workplace. Doing so can help facilitate collaborative relationships 
between workers and firm managers.29 It also addresses several of the efficiency-based 
objections to collective bargaining by moving the topics over which much bargaining 
occurs away from work rules and toward economic standards. 30 
Despite these arguments, a system of labor law that empowers unions to bargain on 
behalf of all or most workers, with active support from the state, has long been considered 
to be unworkable and unachievable in the United States. 31 Sectoral bargaining, the 
conventional wisdom holds, is distinctly European, unmoored from American culture 
and history. 32 
Arguments for sectoral bargaining, however, are not merely academic; nor can they be 
dismissed as efforts to import a system from abroad. Rather, sectoral bargaining is 
analogous to the pattern bargaining achieved in the 1940s and 1950s by powerful unions 
in industries like auto and steel, or multiemployer bargaining like in coalmining or 
janitorial services.33 It also recalls the tripartite wage boards that were part of the early 
Fair Labor Standards Act, enabling unions, along with employers, to set minimum 
standards on an industry-by-industry basis.34 More important, a model of state-supported 
sectoral bargaining is emerging from the efforts of today's most energetic and successful 
worker movements. 
Consider the "Fight for $15," a campaign of low-wage workers organized by the 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as well as by other worker groups 
representing domestic workers, airport staff, Uber drivers, and more. These workers have 
been pressing localities and states to raise minimum wages and enact other employment 
law protections for entire economic sectors and regions. 35 In response, in the last five 
years, over two dozen states and many more localities have raised their minimum 
29 Madland, rupra note 21, at 3, 13-14, 22. 
30 Dimick, supra note 21, at 692 (explaining that when union struchlres are highly decentralized and firm-
based, the rational response of unions is to advocate for "seniority-based layoff policies, job definitions and 
demarcations, internal labor markets, rules limiting employer discretion over technology, manning, and 
staffing requirements, and so forth"). 
31 For discussion of this critique, see Andrias, supra note 6. 
32 See Compa, supra note 7, at 610 (arguing that a "labor and employment law system cannot be wrenched 
from its historical moorings"). 
33 For a discussion of historical pattern bargaining in the 1950s, see NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MosT 
DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT: WALTER REUTHER AND THE FATE OF AMERICAN LABOR 271-298 (1995); 
see also Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, Leaming from the Past: The Relevance of Twentieth-
Century New York Jobbers' Agreements for Twenty-First-Century Global Supply Chains, in ACHIEVING 
WORKERS' RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL EcoNOMY 239 (Richard P. Appelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein eds., 
2013) (describing pattern bargaining among garment workers before the era of globalization); CATHERINE 
L. FISK, WRITING FOR HIRE: UNIONS, HOLLYWOOD, AND MADISON AVENUE (2016) (describing industry-
wide bargaining in Hollywood). 
34 Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616(2019); cf LEON FINK, THE LONG GILDED AGE: AMERICAN CAPITALISM 
AND THE LESSONS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 96 (2015); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE 
OF WOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925 (1987); CHRISTO-
PHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985). 
35 For detailed discussion, see Andrias, supra note 6. 
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wages. 36 Several of these, including California and New York, have enacted increases to 
fifteen dollars an hour - nearly eight dollars an hour more than the federal minimum, to 
be phased in over time. 37 Just a few years ago, increases of this scope and magnitude 
would have been unthinkable. The wage laws have been accompanied by new regula-
tions providing scheduling protection, paid leave, and other benefits. 38 
At first glance, these seem to be ordinary state and local employment statutes, separate 
and apart from the law that governs collective activity by workers. 39 But the laws are a 
direct result of collective worker organizing - and the express goal of the worker 
campaigns is not just higher wages, but also "a union" for all workers in each sector.40 
In fact, many of the new laws that the worker movements have won are actually a product 
of bargaining, either formal or informal, among unions, employers, and the state.41 Such 
efforts are not limited to the low-wage service sector. Public school teachers across the 
36 City Minimum Wage Laws: Recent Trends and Economic Evidence, NAT'L EMP. LAW PROJECT (April 
2016), www.nelp.org/content/uploads/City-Minimum-Wage-Laws-Recent-Trends-Economic-Evidence.pdf 
[https://penna.ccNS5C-D3AX]; Minimum Wage Tracker, EcoN. PoL'Y lNsr. (Sept. 10, 2018), www.epi 
.org/minimum-wage-tracker [https://penna.cc/HTG4-QHZQ]; State Minimum Wages, NATL CONF. OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (July 1, 2018), www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employrnent/state-minimum-wage-
chart.aspx [https://perma.cc/UQ4E-MYMC]. But see Alan Blinder, When a State Balks at a City's 
Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/us/alabama-moves-to-halt-
pay-law-in-birmingham.htrnl [https://penna.cc/WV4R-DJ7E] (describing Alabama state legislature's deci-
sion to overrule Binningham's local minimum wage). 
37 See S.B. 3, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016); City Minimum Wage Laws, supra note 36; Press Release, 
N.Y. Governor's Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs $15 Minimum Wage Plan and 12 Week Paid 
Family Leave Policy into Law (Apr. 4, 2016), www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-15-min 
imum-wage-plan-and-12-week-paid-family-leave-policy-law [https://penna.cc/NYP6-UCQC]. 
38 See Jenny Brown, Fast Food Strikes: What's Cooking?, L'I.BOR NOTES (June 24, 2013), www.labornotes.org/ 
2013/06/fast-food-strikes-whats-cooking [https://perma.cc/A739-Y6CQ]; Patrick McGeehan, Push to Lift 
Minimum Wage Is Now Serious Business, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/07/24/ 
nyregion/push-to-lift-hourly-pay-is-now-serious-business.htrnl [https://perma.cc/S7M8-9VPH]; Ovetta Wig-
gins, Maryland Flexes Progressive Democratic Muscles to Override Two Hogan Vetoes, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 12, 2018 ), www .washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/maryland-will-require-businesses-to-provide-
paid-sick-leave/2018/0 l/l 2/acbla570-f7be-l le 7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.htrnl?utrn_term=. 52c9fa970dlc 
[https://perma.cc/8FH8-LJYR]. 
39 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 2685, 2688-2689 (2008) 
( describing the traditional view that labor and employment law constitute dichotomous regulatory regimes 
and noting critiques of that view); see also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Law in Two 
Transitional Decades, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 495, 526--527 (2004) (explaining that the preceding "two decades 
have continued the shift of emphasis from labor law to employment law - from governmental regulation of 
union-management relations, with collective bargaining expected to set most of the substantive terms of 
employment, to the direct governmental regulation of more and more aspects of the employer-employee 
relationship" and expressing regret at the diminishment of "private initiative and the voluntary arrange-
ments that have made collective bargaining such a uniquely valuable American institution"). 
40 More precisely, the campaign demands fifteen dollars an hour and the right to a union "free of intimida-
tion." See Arun Gupta, Fight for 15 Confidential: How Did the Biggest-Ever Mobilization of Fast-Food 
Workers Come About, and What Is Its Endgame?, IN THESE TIMES, (Nov. 11, 2013), http://inthesetimes 
.com/article/l 5826/fight_for_l 5_confidential [https://perma.cc/Y5V6-SNKS]; see also Lydia DePillis, It's 
Not Just Fast Food: The Fight for $15 Is for Everyone Now, WASH. Posr (Dec. 4, 2014), www.washington 
post.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/12/04/its-not-just-fast-food-the-fight-for-l 5-is-for-everyone-now [https:/ / 
perma.cc/Z7GV-GJ6M]; Josh Eidelson, Fast Food Strikes to Massively Expand: "They're Thinking Much 
Bigger", SALON (Aug. 14, 2013), www.salon.com/2013/08/14/fast_food_strikes_massively_expanding__ 
theyre_thinking__much_bigger [https://perma.cc/N9J2-6M3P]. 
41 See Andrias, supra note 6, at 57-69. 
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nation have recently engaged in an upsurge of labor activity, demanding wage increases 
on a state-wide basis, even in conservative states where teachers lack the legal right to 
bargain collectively. Their strikes have taken direct aim at austerity politics, demanding 
not just fair wages and good benefits, but also adequate education funding and a more 
. d 42 progressive tax co e. 
Critically, the outline of an American form of sectoral bargaining is emerging from the 
efforts of these social movements. That outline is nascent and contested and the specifics 
of what success would look like are far from clear. But from the social movements' efforts 
one can derive a path toward a new labor law regime that is distinct from the legal regime 
that has governed since the New Deal and particularly since 1947. 
First, the new labor law would reject the old regime's commitment to the employer/ 
employee dyad.43 It would locate decisions about basic standards of employment at the 
sectoral, industrial, and regional levels, rather than at the level of the individual worksite 
or employer. Relatedly, the regime would protect broad cross-employer organizing and 
concerted action, and it would encompass even those workers who have long been 
excluded from the definition of "employee." Second, the new labor law would reject 
the principle of private ordering that was cemented in the years following the New Deal, 
under which labor negotiations are a private affair and the state plays a neutral and 
minimal role - a system that accepts existing distributions of power and operates against 
background common law assumptions regarding property and managerial rights. 44 
Instead, the new labor law would position unions as political actors representing workers 
generally and would involve the state as an active participant in supporting collective 
bargaining and union rights.45 Third, and related to the first two moves, the new labor 
law would reject the bifurcation between employment law and labor law that has 
governed in recent decades by rendering the basic terms of employment for all workers 
subject to social bargaining.46 Finally, the new labor law would maintain a role for 
42 Kate Andrias, Feller Lech.Ire: Peril and Possibility: Strikes, Rights, and Legal Change in the Age of Trump, 
40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 137 (2019). 
43 See Karl Klare, The Horizons ofTransformative Labour and Employment Law, in LABOUR LAw IN AN ERA 
OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 3, 23 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 
2002) ("[O]ne must wonder about the adequacy of a model of redistribution classically wedded to the 
employer-employee dyad, when traditional workers and traditional employers are replaced by a complex 
variety of social actors in paid employment."). 
44 For an analysis of how law encouraged the earlier American labor movement's embrace of private ordering 
over statism, see WILLIAM E. F0RBATH, LAw AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 
(1991). 
45 Nelson Lichtenstein, The Demise of Tripartite Governance and the Rise of the Corporate Social Responsi-
bility Regime, in ACHIEVING WoRKERs' RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 95, 95 (Richard P. Appelbaum 
& Nelson Lichtenstein eds., 2016) (noting that the system was "often denominated as 'corporatism' in 
Europe, 'tripartism' in the United States"). 
46 The current phenomenon is markedly different from previous efforts to blur the distinction between 
employment law and labor law. Those tended to use employment law to achieve NLRA aims, see Sachs, 
supra note 39, at 2687 (documenting how "workers and their lawyers are h.Irning to employment statutes 
like the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" to facilitate "their 
efforts to organize and act collectively"), or abandoned a system of unionization in favor of self-regulation 
with elements of worker voice, see CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO Co-REGULATION 52-74 (2010) (describing the fall of collective bargaining and the 
proliferation of substantive mandates). 
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traditional firm-based orfanizing and bargaining, while experimenting with new forms of 
worksite representation. 7 
At the federal level, achieving any pro-worker reform, let alone a broadly inclusive 
system of sectoral bargaining, is impossible in the near term. Yet progressive states and 
localities can move toward the vision by creating or expanding tripartite administrative 
structures that include representatives from worker organizations, business groups, and 
the general public who then negotiate over such employment law standards as minimum 
wages, benefits, health and safety, and scheduling on an industry-by-industry basis. 
Indeed, California, New Jersey, and New York already vest the power to set wages or 
other standards with tripartite commissions.48 These commissions provide an existing 
foothold for a form of sectoral bargaining that can be expanded, even without federal law 
reform.49 
More long term, a federal system of mandatory and inclusive sectoral bargaining is 
essential and achievable. Such reform could take different shapes. 50 One possibility 
would be to combine a significantly strengthened NLRA, including more robust protec-
tion for class-wide organizing and concerted action, as well as new mandates for multi-
employer bargaining, with a system of government-facilitated social bargaining that 
brings labor and business to the table regarding social welfare benefits and minimum 
employment standards. That dual approach builds directly on the efforts of the Fight for 
$15 to date. Yet, it is not the only possible path to sectoral bargaining in the United 
States. Whatever the details entail, the goal must be to create a labor law system that truly 
gives workers power at work, in the economy, and in politics. Such reform is essential to 
salvage and secure labor law's most fundamental commitment to a more egalitarian 
workplace and political economy. 
47 One example is the recently enacted New York City law that allows fast food workers to contribute to 
worker advocacy organizations of their choice, via employer-facilitated paycheck deduction. Fair Work-
week and Fast Food Deductions Law, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE SS 20-1301-10 (2017); see Justin Miller, In 
New York City, Fast-Food Workers May Soon Have a Permanent Voice, AM. PROSPECT (June 15, 2017), 
http://prospect.org/article/new-york-city-fast-food-workers-may-soon-have-permanent-voice [https://perma 
.cc/3GCG-HD7U]. 
48 See CAL. LAB. CODE SS 70-74, 1173, 1178 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. S 34:ll-56a4.7,-56a8, a9; N.Y. 
LAB. LAW S 654 (McKinney 2016). 
49 See Andrias, supra note 6, at 84-92. 
50 See Andrias & Rogers, supra note 21, at 28--33. 
